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‘Again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a 
needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.’ When the 
disciples heard [this,] they were very astonished and said, ‘Then who can 
be saved?’ And looking at [them] Jesus said to them, ‘With people this is 
impossible, but with God all things are possible.’ 
Matthew 19: 24-26 (emphasis added) 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Religion and religious symbols that are attributable to government expression can 
be easily found in public places, forums, and venues. Religious affirmations are 
spoken in our public schools every time the pledge of allegiance is recited to our 
nation “under God.”1 Our national motto, “In God We Trust,” is displayed on every 
piece of U.S. currency. Federal law has provided for the observance of a “National 
Day of Prayer” since the time of the Constitutional framers.2 Chaplains, paid with 
federal funds, are employed by our legislature. Even in our Supreme Court, a 
religious painting of “Moses the Lawgiver” is displayed over the bench and 
reverberates with the cry of  “God save the United States and this Honorable Court” 
at the opening of every session. These are just a few of a great many examples of 
religion and religious ideas and symbols that seem to be a form of government 
expression. 
These expressions of religious themes and ideas are nothing new. Our nation was 
founded on values which flow from a belief in a Supreme Being.3 The Declaration of 
Independence speaks of all men being “created equal” and “endowed by their 
Creator, with certain unalienable rights.”4 The First Congress urged the President to 
declare “a day of public thanksgiving and prayer” to “Almighty God.”5 However, 
these same men who honored the presence of religion in government were wary of 
the type of church-state government against which they had just revolted. For 
protection from such a government, the First Congress passed the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution barring Congress from making 
any “law respecting the establishment of a religion.”6 
With the prevalence of so many religious symbols, phrases and images in our 
public forum, the obvious question that arises is: When do these religious 
“expressions” violate the Establishment Clause? Judges, lawyers and scholars have 
been trying to answer that question in a clear and authoritative way since the passage 
of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment has been 
a “vortex of controversy” for decades.7 Disputes over its interpretation and 
application arise over a wide variety of situations; from prayer in public schools to 
nativity scenes and monuments on public land. The Supreme Court is in perpetual 
disagreement over the interpretation and application of the Establishment Clause. 
                                                                
1The Pledge of Allegiance was amended in 1954 to include the phrase “under God.” See 
H.R. Rep. No. 1693, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339. The 
House Report states that “the inclusion of God in our pledge . . . acknowledges the 
dependence of our people and our Government upon the moral directions of the Creator.” 
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2340. 
236 U.S.C. 169h (1988). 
3ACLU v. Capitol Square Advisory Bd., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184 (1998). 
4THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
5Lynch v. Donnely, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984). 
6U.S. CONST. amend. I §1. 
7Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Paralellelism and the Establishment 
Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763 (1993). 
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The Court has adopted and abandoned various tests and settled on ambiguous and 
flawed options.  
The current battle over Ohio’s state motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” 
has brought the debate over the meaning and application of the Establishment Clause 
to the Sixth Circuit and sparked deep feelings on both sides of the issue. The most 
recent decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals improperly held, using the 
Lemon and endorsement tests, that Ohio’s state motto was an unconstitutional 
violation of the Establishment Clause. The history and jurisprudence of the 
Establishment Clause support the government’s use of generalized, respectful 
references to God, as found in the Ohio state motto. When properly applied, the Ohio 
state motto passes both the Lemon and endorsement tests, even though these tests are 
so fundamentally flawed that they ought to be abandoned in favor of the United 
States Supreme Court’s original Establishment Clause test:  the coercion analysis. 
Part II of this Note will examine the history and jurisprudence surrounding the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. This brief survey will reveal the 
continuing disagreements over the interpretation and application of the 
Establishment Clause while showing that history supports generalized references to 
God by the federal and state government. Part III will introduce the background and 
procedural history of the current case American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio v. 
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board,8 in which the Ohio state motto is being 
attacked as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Part IV will briefly analyze the 
Lemon, endorsement, and coercion tests used in Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
and then apply each test to Ohio’s motto.  The result of this discussion will show that 
history, jurisprudence and logic support upholding Ohio’s state motto as 
constitutional under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  
II.  THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE : OVERVIEW AND ARGUMENTS OF 
INTERPRETATION 
The current battle over Ohio’s state motto starts with the perpetual battle over the 
meaning or “the original intent” of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment 
Clause makes up the first ten words of the First Amendment: “Congress shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion,  . . .”9  The next six words, “or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” are referred to as the Free Exercise Clause.10 
Together, these clauses are known as “the religion clauses.” 
On their face, these clauses express two concerns: “the prohibition of an 
establishment of religion and the guarantee of the free exercise of religion.”11 These 
clauses also express “a tradition of freedom of religious exercise and a tradition of 
freedom from religious exercise.”12  
                                                                
8ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 
9U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
10Id. 
11DEREK DAVIS, ORIGINAL INTENT 46 (1991). 
12Jonathan K. Van Patten, The Partisan Battle Over the Constitution: Meese’s 
Jurisprudence of Original Intention and Brennan’s Theory of Contemporary Ratification, 70 
MARQ. L. REV., 391-92 (1987). 
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Most debate over the framers’ intent in the wording of the religion clauses 
focuses on the Establishment Clause.13  The only point on which there is full 
agreement is the fact that the Establishment Clause was intended to ban the 
establishment of a state church or religion.14  The purpose of the Free Exercise 
Clause is relatively clear compared to that of the Establishment Clause. In the words 
of John Locke, the Free Exercise Clause was intended to preserve the rights of a 
citizen to believe “according to the dictates of his own Conscience,” free from civil 
coercion.15  
Generally speaking, the Establishment Clause is interpreted in one of two 
mutually exclusive ways:  the narrow interpretation or the broad interpretation.16 The 
narrow interpretation, favored by those who have been labeled as “accomodationists” 
and “nonpreferentalists,”17 “holds that the framers intended for the Establishment 
Clause to prevent governmental establishment of a single sect or denomination of 
religion above others.”18 Extreme accomodationists hold that the clause bans only the 
establishment of a state church or religion.19 A “nonpreferentialist,” a less extreme 
subset of “accomodationists,” believes that government may assist religion in a 
variety of ways as long as such aid is imparted without discrimination; that is, if the 
government support does not favor one denomination or sect over others.20 Those 
who hold to this narrow view conclude that the framers “intended only to remove 
religious requirements for public office, prevent the creation of a national church or 
religion, protect freedom of conscience in matters of religion against invasion by the 
national government, and leave the states to deal with questions of religion as they 
saw fit.”21 Robert Cord, a prominent scholar who subscribes to the accomodationist 
point of view, writes: 
There appears to be no historical evidence that the First Amendment was 
intended to preclude Federal government aid to religion when it was 
provided on a non-discriminatory basis. Nor does there appear to be any 
                                                                
13See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 46. 
14Id.   
15John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1685), reprinted in MAIN CURRENTS OF 
WESTERN THOUGHT, ed. Franklin Le Van Baumer, 4th ed. (1978), 355. 
16LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT IN RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 43 (James 
E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985). 
17LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 91 (1986).  
18DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48. 
19Thomas Peters, Bnet: Overview of Church and State Separation Debate, (Jan. 5, 2001) 
available at <http://thomasash.hypermart.net/bnet/items/00022.html>. 
20See LEVY, supra note 17, at 91. 
21See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 49. 
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historical evidence that the First Amendment was intended to provide an 
absolute separation or independence of religion and the national state.22  
These nonpreferentialist views, and especially the view that there is “no wall of 
separation” between the church and the state, are shared by the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, William Rhenquist. He writes in his dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree:23 
It would seem that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had 
acquired a well-accepted meaning: it forbade establishment of a national 
religion, and forbade preference among religious sects or 
denominations. . . . The Establishment Clause did not require neutrality 
between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit the federal government 
from providing non-discriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no 
historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build 
the ‘wall of separation’ that was constitutionalized in Everson. . . . The 
‘wall of separation between church and state’ is a metaphor based on bad 
history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It 
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.24 
Other cited proponents of the nonpreferentialist view today include Supreme Court 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, and in the past included John Cotton 
and Patrick Henry.25 
In contrast to the narrow view that the First Amendment bans only the 
establishment of a state church and preferential treatment between religious sects,26 
the broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause, also known as the  
“separationist” or “no aid” approach, holds that there is a strict “wall of separation” 
between government and religion.27 The separationist believes the First Amendment 
prohibits the government from having anything to do with religion and claims that 
“no church or religious group should receive any form of governmental aid.”28 This 
broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause was first advanced in 1947  by 
Justice Hugo Black in the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education.29 Justice 
Black, writing for a five-to-four majority stated that: 
The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at 
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. 
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion over another. Neither can 
                                                                
22ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE:  HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT 
FICTION 15 (1982). 
23472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
24DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, VOL. II, CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 701 (1991).   
25Larry Pahl, Establishing the History of the Establishment Clause, (Jan. 5, 2001), 
available at <http://members.aol.com/LarryPahl/estab1.htm>. 
26Peters, supra note 19. 
27See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48. 
28See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48. 
29330 U.S. 1 (1947); see also DAVIS, supra 11, at 47. 
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force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from church against 
his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may 
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal 
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of 
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by laws was 
intended to erect a ‘wall of separation between church and State.’30  
The separationists generally believe that the “First Amendment was intended to 
reaffirm that the Constitution granted no power to the federal government over 
religion.”31 Separationists hold that government support of any religious belief or 
practice is a violation of the First Amendment, even if such promotion favors no 
particular sect or religion.32 Their interpretation of the First Amendment is said to be 
an outgrowth of the views held by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.33 
Separationists often cite Jefferson’s 1779 “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom”, 
Jefferson’s famous “wall of separation” metaphor in an 1802 letter to the Danbury 
Baptist Association of Connecticut, and Madison’s “Memorial and Remonstrance.”34  
Even though the narrow and broad interpretations of the Establishment Clause 
are in disagreement, both sides make arguments citing the framers’ original intent. 
Both the separationist and the accomadationist may argue that the framers’ original 
intent supports their position because unclear and often incomplete records make the 
framers’ original intent very difficult to ascertain.35 In addition, examination of the 
history often reveals varying purposes behind the Amendment.36 Clues into the 
framers’ actual intent can be found upon a brief examination of the political 
atmosphere at the time of the ratification of the Establishment Clause, the legislative 
history of the Establishment Clause, and the action taken by the original framers 
after the institution of the Establishment Clause.  
A.  Federalism and the Establishment Clause  
It has been well established that the states, at the time of the ratification of the 
Constitution and its Amendments, jealously guarded their sovereign rights and were 
very suspicious of federal authority.37 This is clearly seen in the Constitution’s 
                                                                
30Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). 
31See Peters, supra note 19. 
32Id. 
33See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 48. 
34See Pahl, supra note 25; 16 Const. Comm 627, 1. 
35See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 50. 
36LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §14-3 (1978). 
37Tom Peters, Bnet: What the founders believed about separation of church and state (Jan 
5, 2001) <http://thomasash.hypermart.net/bnet/items/00024.htm>. 
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provision for a national government of strictly delegated, limited, and enumerated 
powers.38 Those matters not entrusted to the federal government were reserved by the 
states.39 This mode of political organization which unites independent states within a 
larger political framework, while still allowing each state to maintain its own 
political framework, is known as “federalism.”40 In the words of scholar Mark 
Dewolfe Howe, the Constitution, “made national disability the rule and national 
power the exception.”41 Because affirmative power in the religious sphere had not 
been delegated to the national government in the Constitution, “it was acknowledged 
that authority over religious matters was not extended to the federal regime, and the 
states were free to maintain their own church-state arrangements and policies.”42  
When the proposed constitution was being considered by the state-ratifying 
conventions, there was a strong fear that its “centralizing tendencies would crush the 
rights of states and individuals.”43 Because of this fear, and in an attempt to secure 
certain liberties, many states agreed to accept the new document only if a Bill of 
Rights was included.44 The religious clauses of the First Amendment which imposed 
restrictions specifically on “Congress,” affirmed by implication that the states 
retained the power to determine their own church-state policies within their 
jurisdictions.45  
The separationist would argue from these facts that the framers believed that the 
national government and religion are completely separate and that Congress was 
powerless to enact laws that aided religion, even in the absence of the First 
Amendment.46 The nonpreferentialist would argue that these facts simply emphasize 
that the framers’ main motivation behind the First Amendment was to prohibit a 
church-state government. 
B.  The Wording of the Establishment Clause 
James Madison did not want to add a bill of rights to the Constitution and argued 
that such an addition was unnecessary.47 He agreed with the words of Alexander 
Hamilton in the Federalist: “For why declare the things that shall not be done which 
                                                                
38U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
39Id.; James Madison observed that “the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to 
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State 
governments are numerous and indefinite. . . .” THE FEDERALIST 45, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 
288, 292-3 (1961). 
40ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 1994, vol. 4, p.712. 
41MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 19-20 (1965).  
42Daniel L. Dreisbach & John D. Whaley, What the Wall Separates: A Debate on Thomas 
Jefferson’s “wall of Separation” Metaphor, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 627, 650 (1999). 
43See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 52. 
44Id. at 53. 
45See Dreisbach, supra note 42, at 649. 
46See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 52. 
47Id. at 53. 
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there is no power to do?”48 However, because many states had ratified the new 
Constitution with the understanding that there would be forthcoming amendments to 
safeguard certain human and state rights from encroachment by the national 
government, Madison felt “bound in honor” to propose a Bill of Rights.49 The first 
version of the amendment was introduced by Madison to the House of 
Representatives in 178950 and read:  
The civil rights of none shall be abridged on the account of religious 
belief, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and 
equal rights of conscience in any manner or any pretext be infringed.51  
Proponents of a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause view the use 
of the word “national” as proof that Madison simply intended a prohibition against 
forming a state church.52 However, proponents of the broad view would point out 
that only a few years earlier, Madison spoke out against a bill in the Virginia 
legislature “calling for the general tax assessment for the support of, not one, but all 
Christian [sects].”53  He later referred to this bill as “an establishment of religion.”54 
What is agreed, is that it is difficult to know just what Madison meant by prohibiting 
the establishment of a “national religion.”   
The word “national” was quickly edited out of the proposal by the House 
subcommittee; and after many other proposals and much debate, the House approved 
the following broader amendment: “Congress shall make no law establishing 
religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of 
conscience.”55 
The Senate began debates, conducted in secrecy, on the House Amendments on 
September 3, 1789.56 The only record of these debates that exists is the sparse 
account of motions and votes in the Senate Journal.57 According to that record, three 
alternatives to the House amendment were proposed and defeated.58 Each of these 
defeated “motions restricted the ban in the proposed amendment to establishments 
                                                                
48THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 at 481 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
491 ANNALS OF CONG. 441 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); reprinted in Kurland and Lerner, THE 
FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION, 5: Bill of Rights, No. 11, 21-32. 
50See Peters, supra note 37. 
51See supra note 49, at 434.  
52See DAVIS, supra note 11 at 55. 
538 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 298-306 (Robert A. Rutland, ed., 1976). 
54Id. 
55See Peters, supra note 37. 
56See LEVY, supra note 17, at 81. 
57Id. at 82. 
58The three proposed and defeated amendments were as follows: “Congress shall make no 
law establishing one religious sect or society in preference to others,” “Congress shall not 
make any law infringing the rights of conscience, or establishing any religious sect or society,” 
“Congress shall make no law establishing any particular denomination of religion in 
preference to another.” Id. 
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preferring one sect above others.”59  Instead, the Senate adopted the broader language 
of the House: “Congress shall make no law establishing religion.” Some have argued 
that this proves “that the Senate intended something broader than merely a ban on 
preference to a sect.”60 However, the Senate altered the Amendment six days later; 
the alteration which, like the previously defeated motions, “had the unmistakable 
meaning of limiting the ban to acts that prefer one denomination over others or that, 
to put it simply, established a single state church.”61 It read: “Congress shall make no 
law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free 
exercise of religion. . . .”62 The Senate’s narrow version of the Amendment was then 
sent to the House where it was rejected.63  
Because the House and the Senate had approved different versions of the Bill of 
Rights, a conference committee was proposed to resolve the differences.64 On 
September 25, 1789, a compromise Amendment was agreed upon which stated: 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof.”65 The committee left no records of their deliberations.66  
What little record that is available of the deliberations behind the drafting of the 
Establishment Clause only adds to the confusion over its meaning.  Both narrow and 
broad proposed amendments were debated and rejected. As has been shown, the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment can be interpreted both ways. 
However, a brief look at the actions taken by the framers after its passage may shed 
some light on its true meaning.   
C.  The Actions of the Original Framers of the Establishment Clause 
Studying how those who drafted the Establishment Clause used and applied the 
Amendment is one of the best ways to determine their intent in its passage.  The 
actions of the framers of the Establishment Clause do not comply with the 
separationists claim that the Amendment was intended “to create a state of complete 
independence between religion and government.”67 Instead, the actions of the 
framers reveal a government that both tolerates and embraces the presence of 
religion.  
One of the most blatant examples of the framers’ acknowledgment of religious 
ideas in government lies in the fact that the first House of Representatives proposed 
the Establishment Clause one day and then proposed a Presidential proclamation of 
                                                                
59Id.  
60Id. 
61See LEVY, supra note 17, at 82. 
62DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 1:166 (Linda Grant DePauw, ed. 1971).  
63See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 60 
64See LEVY, supra note 17, at 83.  
65See supra note 48, at 913. 
66See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 60. 
67See CORD, supra note 22, at 50 
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“Thanksgiving and Prayer” the very next day.68 President George Washington’s first 
“National Thanksgiving Proclamation” acknowledges “the providence of Almighty 
God” and calls for the people of the United States to offer “prayers and supplications 
to the great Lord and Ruler of Nations.”69 Many of those who voted for the First 
Amendment apparently saw no conflict with the Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 
and voted for its passage.70 Even Madison himself did not object to the resolution 
requesting the Thanksgiving Day Proclamation.71 In fact, he issued at least four 
proclamations calling for a day of “public thanksgiving and prayer” during his 
presidency.72 These do not seem like the actions of men who intended the complete 
separation of government and religion.  
Another example lies in the existence of chaplains in both the Continental 
Congress and the First Congress. Again, Madison was a member of the 
Congressional Committee that recommended that Congressional Chaplains be 
elected.73 The First Congress also authorized the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to appoint a chaplain for “Military Establishments of the 
United States.”74 This statute was advanced by the Second and Third Congresses.75  
Clues into the original framers’ view of the relationship between religion and the 
government can also be seen in some of this nation’s earliest treaties with the Native 
Americans. The Establishment Clause did not stop Jefferson from providing money 
to build a church and other religious needs to the Kaskaskia Indians in an 1803 
treaty.76 Other early American presidents who joined Jefferson in committing federal 
money to build churches through treaty agreements include George Washington, 
James Monroe, Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren.77 Federal money was also 
used to support religion, missionary teachers, and church schools in a campaign “to 
civilize” the Native Americans.78 Although it may be argued that these events were 
merely the product of the culture at that time, if the Establishment Clause was meant 
to prohibit the national government from having anything to do with religion, then its 
original framers surely violated their own intentions with their actions. It is logical to 
conclude from these actions taken by the framers of the First Amendment that the 
                                                                
68Id. at 51. 
69JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE 
PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, 1:64 (1901). 
70See CORD, supra note 22, at 51. 
71See supra note 49, at 949-50. 
72See CORD, supra note 22, at 53. 
73Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, First Sess. Of the Thirty Third 
Congress, in three vols., (A.O.P. Nicholson, Printer. 1854), Vol. II, House of Representatives 
Document 124.  
74See CORD, supra note 22, at 54. 
75Id. 
76LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM, 67-79 (rev. ed. 1967).  
77See CORD, supra note 22, at 59. 
78Id. at 63. 
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Establishment Clause was not intended to completely separate religion and 
government. 
D.  The Supreme Court’s  Working Interpretation of the Establishment Clause 
While the debate still rages over the meaning of the Establishment Clause, a 
working line of jurisdictional precedent has been established. In order to determine 
whether the Ohio State Motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” violates the 
Establishment Clause, it is important to look to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
with respect to this issue. An examination of these cases will reveal that although a 
few tests find general acceptance, the Supreme Court is deeply divided over how to 
apply the Establishment Clause to government action that expresses or affirms 
religion.79  
While earlier Establishment Clause cases were heard by the Supreme Court, 
Everson v. Board of Education80 is generally considered to be “the first case . . . in 
which the Court really came to grips with the question of applying the First 
Amendment’s [E]stablishment [C]lause.”81 In this case, Everson, a district taxpayer, 
challenged a New Jersey statute which authorized the reimbursement of 
transportation expenses to parents of children in both parochial and public schools.82 
Everson argued that the statute forced him to help support and maintain schools 
dedicated to the Catholic Faith and was, therefore, a “law respecting an 
establishment of religion.”83 The Court found that the statute did not violate the 
Establishment Clause and held that state or federal government practice could neither 
“force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will 
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”84 The Court also held 
that “[n]o person [could] be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs 
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.”85 The form of analysis used 
by the Court here has come to be known as the “coercion analysis.”86 This mode of 
analysis, influenced by the writings of Madison and Jefferson, “require[s] a specific 
finding of government coercion for a state or federal practice to be considered a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.”87  Under the coercion analysis, 
“[g]overnment must have coerced or compelled an individual to religious practice or 
belief for a constitutional violation to have occurred.”88  In Everson, the Court held 
                                                                
79E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183, 
1185 (1994). 
80330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
81M. GLENN ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 173 (6th ed. 1992). 
82Everson, 330 U.S. at 1, 5. 
83Id. at 8. 
84Id. at 15-16. 
85Id. 
86Kristen J. Graham, Comment: The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle as the Touchstone 
of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L. REV 147 (1994). 
87Id. at 149. 
88Id. 
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that to strike down the statute and to disallow transportation for children attending 
parochial schools, would both allow the government to, in effect, “force [students] 
. . . to remain away from church against [their] will” and punish taxpaying citizens 
“for entertaining or professing religious beliefs.”89  The Supreme Court continued to 
use the coercion analysis in questions of religious establishment in the years 
following Everson.90  
In the 1962 case Engel v. Vitale,91 the Court began to reject the coercion analysis, 
the basis on which prior case law in this area had been decided. The Court, in dicta, 
eliminated the coercion analysis from its Establishment Clause jurisprudence stating:  
[T]he Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not 
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is 
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion 
whether [the] laws operate directly to coerce non-observing individuals or 
not.92  
One year after Engel, in Abington School District v. Schempp,93 the Court again 
rejected the coercion analysis, declaring that “a violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so 
attended.”94 Because Engel diverted from the precedent of the coercion analysis, the 
Court began to develop new ideas and theories in Establishment Clause doctrine that 
would ultimately be combined to create a new test.  
The issue set before the Court in Schempp was whether a state could statutorily 
require Bible readings or recitations of the Lord’s prayer in public school 
classrooms.95 The Court found that this law required religious exercise and was 
therefore a violation of the Establishment Clause based on the concept of strict 
neutrality.96 The Court explained this concept by declaring that the “[g]overnment 
[must] maintain strict neutrality [by] neither aiding nor opposing religion.”97 Writing 
for the majority, Justice Clark wrote that this “neutrality” stems from the historical 
fear of a state-church and stated that the Establishment Clause mandates that all 
legislation must have a secular purpose and a “primary effect” that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion.98 However, Justice Goldberg warned in his concurring opinion 
                                                                
89Id. at 156 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16).. 
90See Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); see also, 
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
91370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
92Id. at 430. 
93374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
94Id. at 223. 
95Id. 
96Id. at 225. 
97Id.  
98The test is: “what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the 
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative 
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that the concept of neutrality could be taken too far when he stated that “untutored 
devotion to the concept of neutrality can lead to . . . a brooding and pervasive 
devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious” which 
is “not only not compelled by the Constitution but . . . [is] prohibited by it.”99  
A few years later the Court in Waltz v. Tax Commissioner100 expounded on the 
test in Schempp by adding a third component: that the “end result,” or “effect’ of the 
legislation, “is not an excessive government entanglement with religion.”101 These 
three components were formally articulated by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman102 
and have come to be known as the “Lemon test.”103 The Court very clearly articulated 
this three-pronged test based on the previously discussed cases: “First, the statute 
must have a secular legislative purpose; Second, its principal or primary effect must 
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [Third], the statute must not foster 
‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”104 The Court clarified the 
application of the Lemon test in Stone v. Graham105 when it said that “[i]f a statute 
violates any of these three principles, it must be struck down under the Establishment 
Clause.”106  
Although the Lemon test has been widely used and accepted as the test to 
determine violations of the Establishment Clause, it has also been criticized by 
scholars, lawyers and even Justices of the Supreme Court.107 Application of the 
Lemon test has been called “unclear and unpredictable” because of its fluctuating 
meaning.108 Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree109 stated that the Lemon 
test “has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does the wall 
theory upon which it rests.”110 In Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,111 
Justice Kennedy wrote that he did “not wish to be seen as advocating, let alone 
                                                          
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of 
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion.” Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. 
99Id. at 306. 
100397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
101Id. at 674. 
102403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
103Id. 
104Id. at 612-13. 
105449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
106Id. at 39-40. 
107See Graham, supra note 85, at 165.  
108Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72 EDUC. L. REP.1, 3 
(1992). Franklin says that “[t]he literal language of Lemon has remained intact but the 
meaning attached to each of the three test questions has fluctuated depending on which Justice 
wrote the Court’s decision.” Id. at 2. 
109472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
110Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to Madison’s “wall of separation.”). 
111492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
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adopting, [the Lemon] test as [the] primary guide in this difficult area.”112 Justice 
Scalia has likened the Lemon test to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie” which 
“after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . stalks our Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.”113 As many as five of the Justices currently sitting on the Supreme 
Court have, in their own opinions, criticized Lemon and a sixth has joined an opinion 
doing so.114  
In order to eliminate the Lemon test’s “tendenc[y] toward subjectivity and 
formalism,” Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch v. Donnely115 proposed a 
modification to Lemon that has come to be known as the “endorsement test.”116 In 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, the Establishment Clause prohibits government from 
“making adherence to religion relevant, in reality or in public perception, to [a 
person’s] standing in the political community.”117 She believes “what is crucial is 
that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”118 The test of whether a 
governmental act actually does endorse a religion was clarified by Justice O’Connor 
in Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinnette119 when she stated that the 
question to ask is whether a “reasonable observer” would perceive the government 
practice as endorsing religion.120 
Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test was met with approval from those who saw 
the need to modify the Lemon test.121 However, it, too, has met with much criticism. 
                                                                
112Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
113Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993); See 
also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 613 (Scalia dissenting). Justice Scalia writes: “In the 
past we have attempted to justify our embarrassing Establishment Clause jurisprudence on the 
ground that it ‘sacrifices clarity and predictability for flexibility.’ … I think it time that we 
sacrifice some ‘flexibility’ for ‘clarity and predictability.’ Abandoning Lemon’s purpose test 
. . . would be a good place to start.” Id. at 639-40. 
114See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718-21 (1994); Lee v. Weisman, 505 
U.S. 577, 644 (1992); Allegheny, 462 U.S. at 655-57; Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 573 (1989); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107-113; 
Sch. Dist. Of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985). Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 
263, 282 (1981); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134-135 (1977); Justice 
White stated in Roemer v. Board of Public Works: “I am no more reconciled now to Lemon 
. . . than I was when it was decided. . . . The threefold test of Lemon…imposes unnecessary, 
and . . . superfluous tests for establishing ‘when the State’s involvement with religion passes 
the peril point’ for First Amendment purposes.” 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., 
concurring). 
115465 U.S. 668 (1984). The Lynch majority upheld a creche display as constitutional 
because of the holiday environment in which it was displayed. 
116Andrew Rotstein, Good Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and the Establishment 
Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1770 (1993). 
117Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687. 
118Id. 
119515 U.S. 753; 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). 
120Id. at 777 (O’Conner, J., concurring). 
121See Graham, supra note 86, at 168. 
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One of the major criticisms is the difficulty of defining “endorsement.” The concept 
of having an Establishment Clause violation based on the “reasonable observer’s” 
perception of endorsement “ultimately depends on the eye of the beholder.”122 “For 
this reason, ‘endorsement’ cannot be defined in a way that is both generally 
acceptable and useful.”123 Justice O’Connor has distinguished permissible 
“acknowledgements” of religion from “endorsement,” but most of the widely 
accepted usages she mentioned seem to be more than a mere acknowledgement of 
religion.124 
Although the Lemon test and the endorsement test have serious ambiguities and 
problems, they are still being used today. However, some have argued that the 
Supreme Court is showing signs of moving back to the coercion analysis. Justice 
Kennedy “revitalized” the coercion analysis, which had been neglected by the Court 
for so many years, in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.125 He 
stated that “[a]bsent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive 
or symbolic accommodation is minimal.”126 Kennedy’s statement reveals a view that 
coercion is of primary importance in determining Establishment Clause violations. 
Just as separationists and nonpreferentialists are in disagreement about how to 
define the Establishment Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court is in disagreement about 
how to apply the Establishment Clause. Interpretation and application of the 
Establishment Clause seems to be as organic as the Constitution itself.  Generally 
speaking, most courts today will look to the Lemon test or to the endorsement test to 
determine if a violation of the Establishment Clause has occurred. Such was the case 
in determining whether the Ohio state motto constitutes a violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
III.  THE OHIO STATE MOTTO CASE: ACLU v. CAPITAL SQUARE REVIEW & 
ADVISORY BD. 
A.  Background 
In 1865, the General Assembly of Ohio adopted the motto “Imperium in 
Imperio” which is Latin for “An empire within an empire.”127 However, the motto 
was repealed two years later because it “smacked too much of royalty.”128 Ohio was 
without a motto for 90 years until a Cincinnati school boy, troubled that the state of 
Ohio was without a motto, suggested that the state adopt the phrase “With God all 
                                                                
122See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1220. 
123Id. 
124A few of the examples of  “permissible acknowledgments of religion” mentioned by 
Justice O’Connor include the national motto “In God We Trust” and opening Court sessions 
with “God save the United States and this Honorable Court.” Id. 
125492 U.S. 573 (1989).  
126Id. at 662. 
127ACLU, 20 F.Supp. 2d at 1178. 
128Id.  
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Things Are Possible,” drawn from Matthew 19:26.129 On October 1, 1959 the phrase 
was adopted as the official state motto by an Act of the General Assembly of Ohio.130 
Later, a distinctive design was created which portrayed the motto inscribed on a 
ribbon-like device and combined with the state seal.131 Since the motto’s adoption, it 
has been used by the state and state officials in a variety of ways.132  
In May of 1996, then-Governor George Voinovich recommended to the Capital 
Square Advisory Board that the state motto be inscribed on the grounds of the 
Capitol Square.133 Governor Voinovich was inspired to make this recommendation 
after a trip to India where he observed the use of the motto “Government Work Is 
God’s Work” inscribed on a public building. In December of 1996, the Board voted 
unanimously to engrave the state seal and motto on a granite plaza at the west 
entrance of the statehouse.134 On July 31, 1997, The American Civil Liberties Union 
of Ohio, Inc. [hereinafter referred to as “the ACLU”] and the Reverend Matthew 
Peterson filed an action against the Capital Square Advisory Board, Governor 
Voinovich, Secretary of State Bob Taft, Tax Commissioner Roger W. Tracy, Senator 
Richard H. Finan and two Capital Square officials.135  The ACLU sought “a 
declaratory judgment declaring the Ohio state motto unconstitutional and a 
permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from displaying the motto on the 
Capital Square Plaza and from using it in any official way in the future.”136  
B.  District Court Decision 
On September 1, 1998, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Ohio denied the ACLU’s request to declare the Ohio state motto unconstitutional 
or enjoin the defendants from displaying the motto.137 However, the Court did enjoin 
the state from attributing the words of the motto to the text of the Christian New 
Testament.138  
The court came to this conclusion for many reasons. First, the court did not agree 
with the Plaintiff’s argument that because Ohio’s motto is taken directly from the 
                                                                
129Matthew 19:24-26. ‘Again I say to you, it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of 
a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God.’ When the disciples heard {this,} 
they were very astonished and said, ‘Then who can be saved?’. And looking at {them} Jesus 
said to them, ‘With people this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.’" (New 
American Standard) 
130OHIO REV CODE ANN. § 506(5) (Anderson 1959). 
131ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. 
132Brief of Defendant-Appellees at 4, ACLU v. Capitol Square Review and  
Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000) (No.98-4106). 
133ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1178. 
134Id. 
135Id. at 1177 
136Id. at 1178 
137Id. at 1185. 
138ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
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words of Jesus Christ in the Christian New Testament, it is sectarian and endorses 
the Christian religion over other religions.139 The court stated that “removed from 
their . . . New Testament context, the words of the motto do not suggest a 
denominational preference” as they “do not state a principle unique to 
Christianity.”140 Second, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the motto 
constitutes a governmental preference of religion over nonreligion, which violates 
the Establishment Clause.141 The court relied heavily on Marsh v. Chambers,142 
which held that certain “acknowledgment[s] of religion . . . regarded as part of the 
‘fabric of our society’ are permitted by the Constitution.”143 The court, citing many 
examples such as our national motto “In God We Trust” and the language “One 
Nation Under God” in the pledge of allegiance, found that Ohio’s state motto was 
both “embedded in [the] history and tradition of this country” and was a 
constitutional acknowledgment of religion.144  
The district court also concluded that this case is, like Marsh, an exception to the 
rule of Lemon v. Kurtzman.145 The Court noted that even if the Lemon test did apply 
to this case, the result would not change, because the motto passes all three prongs of 
the Lemon test. The district court also concluded that Ohio’s motto passes Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test because the motto fits into the category of 
“acknowledgments” of religion.146 The district court noted from a historical 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause that it is proper for the federal government 
to acknowledge religion in various ways.147  
C.  Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Plaintiffs appealed the decision of the district court and the case was argued 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on November 4, 
1999.148 The decision that came down five months later reversed the decision of the 
district court and remanded it for entry of a permanent injunction enjoining the state 
of Ohio and its agents from using the words “With God All Things Are Possible” as 
the official state motto.149 This court disagreed with the district court’s view that in 
determining whether there is a violation of the Establishment Clause, the Ohio state 
motto should be viewed out of the context of the Christian New Testament from 
                                                                
139Id. at 1178. 
140Id. at 1179. 
141Id. at 1183. 
142463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
143Id.  ACLU, 20 F. Supp.2d at 1180 (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 
(1983)). 
144ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. 
145403 U.S. 602 (1971); ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
146ACLU, 20 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. 
147Id. at 1184. 
148ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 210 F.3d 703 (6th Cir. 2000). 
149Id. at 727. 
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which it is drawn.150 The court cited many cases which stress the importance of using 
context to determine the meaning of words.151 The Court of Appeals interpreted the 
words of Jesus used for the Ohio state motto as “explaining to [the disciples] what 
was needed of them to enter heaven and achieve salvation.”152 They held that, viewed 
in that context, the “reasonable observer” of the endorsement test would see an 
advancement of the Christian religion and a violation of the Establishment Clause.153 
The court also felt that the words of the motto, interpreted this way, violate the 
second prong of the Lemon test in that the motto “advances the Christian religion.”154 
Consequently, the court determined that Ohio’s state motto was unconstitutional. 
However, a majority of the judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit later voted to rehear this case en banc.155 Under Sixth Circuit Rule 
35(a) the effect of this hearing en banc will be to vacate their previous opinion and 
judgment and to restore the case on the docket sheet as a pending appeal.156 The en 
banc hearing took place on December 6, 2000, and the decision of the court is still 
pending. 
IV.  AN ANALYSIS OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND HOW 
IT AFFECTS THE OHIO STATE MOTTO 
The decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals finding Ohio’s state motto 
unconstitutional is based on a misapplication of the faulty tests that have been 
accepted under the jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause. The Lemon and the 
endorsements tests generally used by the courts to determine violations of the 
Establishment Clause should be abandoned.  However, Ohio’s state motto is found to 
be constitutional under the First Amendment of the Establishment Clause even when 
these problematic tests are properly applied. 
A.  Strict Neutrality: The Illusory Foundation of the Lemon Test 
The Lemon test should not be used to determine whether the motto of the state of 
Ohio is a violation of the Establishment Clause and should be abandoned all 
together.  As stated above, the concept of “strict neutrality” is the basis behind the 
first two prongs of the Lemon test.157 Secular speech is considered “neutral,” if “it 
favors neither theism nor atheism and encourages neither belief nor disbelief.”158 
                                                                
150Id. at 724. 
151Id. 
152Id. at 725. 
153ACLU, 210 F.3d at 727. 
154Id. 
155ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 222 F.3d 268, 2000 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16276 (6th Cir. Jul. 14, 2000). 
156Id. 
157The Lemon test states that “[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, it’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
finally, the statute must not foster (an excessive government entanglement with religion).” 
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
158See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1191.  
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Therefore, to a “strict neutralitist,” a complete ban on religious speech and 
symbolism is seen not as a discrimination against religion but as “proper treatment” 
under the Establishment Clause.159  
There are two main problems with this “strict neutrality” view of the 
Establishment Clause upon which the Lemon test is based.  First, as has been shown 
above, the history and wording of the Establishment Clause demonstrates that it was 
never meant to create a purely secular state.160 The founders forbade government, not 
from making any law “advancing religion” or even “respecting religion,” but only 
from making any law “respecting an establishment of religion.”161 Further, the 
Establishment Clause does not specifically forbid official expression of religious 
ideas or symbolism that do not reach the level of an “establishment.”162 Indeed, the 
actions of the framers discussed above, expressed religious ideas and sentiments in 
many facets of the government. The Ohio state motto fits into such historically 
accepted general references to God. 
Second, the claim of neutrality is “illusory because secular or nonreligious 
speech is not always ‘neutral’ toward religion.”163 To prohibit religious speech in any 
facet of the government in favor of secular speech would privilege an atheistic view 
of reality over a religious or theistic view of reality because the atheist and agnostic 
must necessarily speak in secular terms.164 “Secular language need not be openly 
antagonistic toward religion to conflict with it; it need only affirm the contrary.”165 
For example, a public school science teacher may not openly teach religious views 
on the origin of the universe and the beginning of life, but the secular perspective on 
the subject (the only perspective a public school teacher is allowed to teach) is 
irreconcilable with the tenets of many religious groups.166 Therefore “to mandate 
‘official agnosticism,’ . . . is not necessarily to mandate ‘official neutrality’ between 
theism and atheism.”167 As Walter Mobley puts it: 
[I]t is a fallacy to suppose that by omitting a subject you teach nothing 
about it. On the contrary you teach that it is to be omitted, and that it is 
therefore a matter of secondary importance. And you teach this not openly 
                                                                
159See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 
199 (1992).  
160See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1192. 
161U.S. CONST. amend. I. § 1. 
162Id. 
163See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1192. 
164Id. at 1195. 
165Id. 
166In his concurrence in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, Justice Jackson 
expressed his reservations about whether it was possible or desirable “completely to isolate 
and cast out of secular education all that some people may reasonably regard as religious 
instruction” because “nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which 
gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences.” 333 U.S. 203, 235-36 (1948). 
167Wallace, supra note 79, at 1195. 
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and explicitly . . . [but] insinuate it silently, insidiously, and all but 
irresistibly.168  
The point of this discussion is, in the words of scholar E. George Wallace, “not that 
secularization of the public order [in the name of strict neutrality] is wrong because it 
amounts to an establishment of a secular ‘religion.’  Rather, it is wrong because it 
allows the state to disregard or disparage religion, but not to speak favorably of it.”169 
This is not true neutrality nor the kind that was intended to be promoted by the 
Establishment Clause. Therefore, because the first two prongs of the Lemon test are 
based on the illusory concept of strict neutrality, the test should be abandoned and 
not be used to determine whether the Ohio state motto violates the Establishment 
Clause.  
B.  The Ohio State Motto Under the Lemon Test 
Although the Supreme Court has pointed out some of these major flaws in the 
Lemon test170 and has stated that it is not the exclusive test or criterion in 
Establishment Clause cases,171 it is still often used by courts in Establishment Clause 
cases.  But even when Ohio’s state motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” is 
applied to Lemon, it passes all three prongs of the test. 
First, the motto of the state of Ohio, “With God All Things Are Possible,” clearly 
has a secular purpose as required by the first prong of the Lemon test.  As stated by 
the district court, citing the Defendant’s memorandum in ACLU v. Capital Square, 
“[The Ohio state motto] inculcates hope, makes Ohio unique, solemnizes occasions, 
and acknowledges the humility that government leaders frequently feel in grappling 
with difficult public policy issues.”172 The Supreme Court says that such a 
“government assertion of a legitimate secular purpose is entitled to deference”173 and 
that it is “reluctan[t] to attribute unconstitutional motives to the States” on the first 
prong of the Lemon test.174 For these reasons, the motto of the state of Ohio easily 
passes the Lemon’s prong. 
Ohio’s motto passes the second prong of Lemon in that it does not have the 
primary effect of advancing religion. Acknowledgments of the generalized presence 
of God have been historically embraced by the federal government, have been 
upheld under the Establishment Clause of the Constitution, and do not primarily 
advance religion.175  As has been shown above such acknowledgments of God are 
                                                                
168Id. at 1200 (citing WALTER MOBLEY, THE CRISIS IN THE UNIVERSITY 56 (1949)). 
169See Wallace, supra note 79, at 1199. 
170At least five members of the Supreme Court have criticized the Lemon decision. See 
supra note 110.  
171Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.  
17220 F. Supp 2d 1176 at 1182 (citing Memorandum Contra Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction at 21). 
173Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997). 
174Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1308 (1998). 
175Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1211 
(1996). 
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“deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country”.176 The Ohio state 
motto, is consistent with the national tradition of making respectful references to 
God and does not primarily advance religion. The example most applicable to the 
Ohio motto case is found in the accepted Constitutional acknowledgment of God in 
the United States national motto, “In God We Trust.”177 Each time the 
constitutionality of the national motto has been challenged, it has been found to be 
acceptable under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.178 In the most 
recent case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the statutes establishing the use of the 
national motto “easily meet the requirements of the Lemon test.”179 The national 
motto and the Ohio state motto are very similar.  Both mottos can be found in the 
Bible.  The Ohio state motto comes from Matthew 19:26 and the national motto can 
be found in Psalms 16:1 and Psalms 56:11.180 Both mottos mention God, but the 
national motto speaks to how we, as American people, relate to God and implies 
something about God’s trustworthiness. The Ohio state motto simply makes a 
statement about God. Dr. Thomas P. Kasulis, Chair of the Division of Comparative 
Studies at The Ohio State University, put it another way when he testified before the 
district court that the words of the U.S. motto suggests a shared national faith that all 
Americans accept, while the Ohio motto is a mere “statement about God, not about 
. . . how we should feel about God.”181 If the national motto, which speaks to the way 
Americans relate to God, does not have as its primary effect the advancement of 
religion, then neither does the Ohio state motto, which merely makes a statement 
about God. The national motto is no more “neutral” between theism and atheism 
than is the Ohio state motto. This is even more evidence that the Establishment 
Clause does not require strict neutrality between a religious and agnostic viewpoints. 
The national motto, along with the pledge of allegiance, legislative prayers, and 
many of the other examples of generalized governmental references to God and 
religion mentioned previously, do not primarily advance religion and do not violate 
the Establishment Clause. The Ohio state motto is such an accepted, generalized 
reference to God.  
The Ohio motto also passes the third prong of the Lemon test in that it does not 
foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. Those who would 
say that the motto constitutes an excessive entanglement suggest that the motto 
creates “the involvement of government in Christian theology.”182 However, as 
                                                                
176Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-88 (1983). 
17736 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
178See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 
1211(1996); O’Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 930 
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179Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216. 
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181See supra note 132, at 28 (citing Defs’ Ex. F Par. 13, JA. 817; Tr. 155-56, JA 234-35). 
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discussed above, generic references to “God” have long been held constitutional and 
“accepted as both a reflection of the nation’s religious heritage, and as a means of 
inspiring and uniting citizens professing a multitude of faiths.”183 The phrase “With 
God All Things Are Possible” is not unique to the Christian religion alone. Some 
religious authorities have gone so far as to say that virtually all religions 
acknowledge a similar power in their god or gods.184 Statements similar to Ohio’s 
motto can be found in most of the world’s major religions. Under Judaism, the writer 
of Genesis asks “Is there anything too hard for the Lord?”185; and Job says of his God 
that “Thou canst do all things.”186 The Muslim can read in the Koran that “surely 
God has power over all things.”187 The Hindu scriptures say of the Hindu divinity 
that, “the whole universe is ever in his power.”188 Ohio’s motto is even similar to the 
words of the ancient Greek philosopher Homer, who wrote in The Odyssey, “To the 
gods all things are possible,”189 as well as to Sophocles in Ajax, who wrote, “When a 
god works, all is possible.”190 From these few examples, it is clear that the idea 
behind the phrase “With God All Things Are Possible” is not unique to Christianity 
alone and the use of such a motto by the State of Ohio does not constitute an 
excessive entanglement of the government with Christian theology.  
In recent years, federal courts have upheld the use of many religious symbols, 
phrases and activities that seem to carry a far greater risk of entanglement than that 
which could be perceived to come out of the Ohio state motto.191 As has been 
previously discussed, the actions of the framers and of modern legislatures and 
courts show that the Establishment Clause does not require that all references to 
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184Id. at 18 (citing Defs’ Ex. F, ¶ ¶ 3-7. JA 813-15; Tr. 151-52. JA 230-31). 
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Allegiance in public schools), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 950 (1993); Doe v. Louisiana Supreme 
Ct., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18803 (E.D. La. 1992) (upholding the use of “in the year of our 
Lord” on Louisiana law licenses and notarial commissions); Murray v. City of Austin, 947 
F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding city insignia displaying Christian cross), cert. denied,  
505 U.S. 1219 (1992); Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding 
establishment of a prayer room in the Illinois State Capitol).  
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religion be stripped from the affairs of government and that general references to 
God, such as found in the Ohio state motto, do not constitute an excessive 
entanglement between the government and religion. For these reasons, whether the 
Lemon test is abandoned or not, the Ohio motto does not violate the three-part Lemon 
test. 
C.  The Ambiguous “Reasonable Observer” of the Endorsement Test 
Ohio’s motto also withstands the endorsement test even though the test is 
vulnerable to observer bias and is ambiguous in definition.  As such, it should also be 
abandoned. As stated previously, under this test, the standard for assessing whether a 
government practice endorses religion is whether “the reasonable observer” would 
view the practice as an endorsement.192 This begs the question: Who is the 
reasonable observer? Justice O’Connor tried to answer this question in Pinette: 
[T]he applicable observer is similar to the ‘reasonable person’ in tort law, 
who ‘is not to be identified with any ordinary individual, who might 
occasionally do unreasonable things,’ but is ‘rather a personification of a 
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective] 
social judgment.’ . . . [T]he reasonable observer in the endorsement 
inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and context of the 
community and forum in which the religious display appears.193  
This definition of a fictitious objective observer “falsely assumes that there is a 
single impartial perspective from which to judge whether government has ‘endorsed’ 
religion.”194 Does someone who is the “personification of a community ideal of 
reasonable behavior” share the predominant religious sensibilities of his or her 
community or hold to a minority view? Is this mystery person religious, agnostic, 
separationist, or nonpreferentialist? In a nation that is as religiously diverse as the 
United States, there is no uniform perspective from those who are “outside” or 
“inside” religion.195 In the end, the only perceptions that count seems to be those of 
the judges.196 Some have gone so far as to say that the endorsement test is merely a 
“cloaking device” to “obscur[e] intuitive judgments made from the individual 
judge’s own personal perspective.”197 Such an ambiguous measurement for a 
violation of the Establishment Clause is not reliable and should be abandoned.  
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D.  The Ohio State Motto Under the Endorsement Test 
Although the endorsement test has met with much criticism,198 it is still used by 
many courts today and has been applied to the Ohio state motto.199 Ohio’s motto does 
not violate the endorsement test. As has been discussed above, the relevant question 
is whether “the reasonable observer” would view the Ohio state motto as an 
endorsement.  The ACLU claims that the reasonable, informed observer would see 
Ohio’s state motto as an endorsement of religion because such an observer “would 
know . . . that the Ohio motto consists of the words of Jesus Christ as quoted in the 
Gospel of Matthew” and that these words purportedly refer to “the salvation of 
souls.”200  
This statement makes two claims. First, that words or concepts that appear in the 
Bible or that are the words of Jesus Christ are “off limits” to the government, even if 
(as in this case) the words or concepts appear in multiple religious and non-religious 
texts. This claim presupposes that the words of the motto retain the same meaning 
that they had 2,000 years ago when they were spoken by Jesus Christ, although 
removed from their original context and put into a new one.  Second, the claim is 
that the words of the Ohio state motto actually do refer solely to “the salvation of 
souls.” There are problems with each of these claims. 
Words or concepts that appear in the Bible, whether spoken by Jesus Christ or 
not, are not banned from use by public officials in the public arena. Again, the 
historical and modern use of Biblical words and concepts in many facets of the 
government cries out against this claim.201 As brought out by the district court, 
“[m]any aphorisms which are part of our common vocabulary have their origin in the 
Hebrew Bible or the Christian New Testament.”202 If words found in the Bible or 
spoken by Jesus Christ were truly banned from use in the public sector, then 
innumerable changes would have to be made in our government. Historically 
accepted, governmental acknowledgments of God such as  our national motto, based 
on passages from the Psalms, would have to be struck down as unconstitutional. 
Also, familiar sayings and proverbs such as the golden rule, “Do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you,”203 and “Love your neighbor as yourself”204 could 
never be held up by government officials as ideals worthy of following. Such a 
drastic step was never the intention of the framers and is surely not the practice of 
our government today.   
The context of the Ohio state motto does not constitute an endorsement of 
religion. While it is true that the Supreme Court has consistently found that “the 
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meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the 
context in which it is used,”205 it is not necessarily true that the meaning of words or 
phrases must be drawn from their original context. Once the words “With God All 
Things Are Possible” were removed from the gospel of Matthew and codified as the 
Ohio state motto in Ohio Rev. Code § 5.06 alongside other state symbols such as the 
Ohio state flower206 and the state bird,207 and once those words were placed under the 
seal of the state of Ohio and displayed on various forms and buildings, they obtain a 
new context from which to draw their meaning. As the district court writes 
“[r]emoved from their Christian New Testament context, the words of the motto do 
not suggest a denominational preference.”208 Neither do they “state a principle 
unique to Christianity.”209  
The Ohio motto, like other statements used by the government, potentially 
operates on two levels.210 For example, the words of Jesus found in John 8:32, “Ye 
shall know the truth and the truth shall set you free,” adorn the Ohio State University 
College of Law and also serve as the motto for the United States Central Intelligence 
Agency [hereinafter “CIA”].211 A brief glimpse into other passages of the Bible 
reveal what Jesus originally meant when he spoke of “the truth” and being “set free.”  
Later in the same gospel, Jesus makes another statement about truth: “I am the way, 
the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except through Me.”212 And the 
apostle Paul said in Romans 6:22 that to be “set free” means that being “set free from 
sin . . . you have . . . everlasting life.”  
From these passages it can be deduced that when Jesus was speaking of “the 
truth” he was really speaking of himself, and the freedom of which he spoke was the 
freedom from the bondage of sin unto salvation. On one level, the phrase, “Ye shall 
know the truth and the truth shall set you free,” speaks directly to the salvation of 
souls through Jesus Christ.  On another level, and in the new context of being 
associated with the study of law at Ohio State or the enforcement of law at the CIA, 
the phrase speaks to the secular purpose of “advocating the liberating pursuit of truth 
(whether religious or not) in the practice [and enforcement] of law.”213 It is obvious 
to the “reasonable observer” that the motto of the CIA is not meant to convey the 
message of salvation through Jesus Christ because it is not the purpose of the CIA to 
proclaim that message. Rather, the reasonable and informed observer would know 
that the job of the CIA is to search for and find the truth in its investigations so that 
justice might be served and America’s freedoms protected. With this knowledge, the 
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reasonable observer would know that despite the phrase’s source and original 
meaning, it obtains a new meaning in its new context. 
This leads to the ACLU’s second claim: that Ohio’s motto refers solely to “the 
salvation of souls.” Just as the CIA’s motto, “Ye shall know the truth and the truth 
shall set you free,” works on two levels, so does the Ohio state motto, “With God All 
Things Are Possible.” The court of appeals in Ohio’s motto case held that they were 
“required to view the words of the motto as part of the text in which they are found 
and give them . . . the meaning intended by Jesus when he addressed his disciples as 
reported by Matthew in the New Testament of the Christian Bible.”214 The court, 
claiming to come at this issue with strict neutrality, took on the very “un-neutral” 
role of Biblical interpreter and found that the words of the motto speak to salvation 
and show a “particular affinity” for Christianity.215 James Madison spoke to such 
actions by the court when he said that any notion that “the Civil Magistrate is a 
competent Judge of Religious Truth” is an “arrogant pretension falsified by the 
contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world.”216 The issue 
of whether courts should be involved in Biblical interpretation aside, the court is 
only partly correct in its conclusions. The words “With God All Things Are 
Possible” were indeed used to answer the question, “[w]ho then can be saved,”217 
posed by the disciples after Jesus had told them how difficult it is for a rich man to 
enter the kingdom of heaven.218 However, the “reasonable observer” can plainly see 
that the statement is not limited only to salvation. The phrase does not say “With 
God Salvation Is Possible,” but rather “With God All Things Are Possible.” “All 
things” does indeed include salvation, but it must, by definition, include everything 
else. “All things” can arguably include secular goals such as balancing the budget, 
ending domestic violence, or breaking down organized crime and drug trafficking 
rings; the heavy tasks of the state that seem impossible to man. Even in its original 
context, Ohio’s motto does not speak to how a man is to be saved but only that such 
salvation is possible. According to the Christian faith, a soul can only be saved by 
grace, through faith in Jesus Christ and His propitiatory work on the cross.219 The 
reasonable observer “aware of the history and context of the community and forum 
in which the [motto] appears”220 would understand these things and accept the Ohio 
state motto as a constitutional acknowledgment of God that inculcates a message of 
hope as citizens face the seemingly impossible tasks of State government. For these 
reasons, the Ohio state motto does not violate the endorsement test. 
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E.  A Return to the Supreme Court’s Original Test: The Coercion Analysis 
Although the Ohio state motto passes both the Lemon test and the endorsement 
test, these tests are so flawed, ambiguous, and cumbersome that they should be 
abandoned in this inquiry in favor of the Supreme Court’s original tool in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence: the coercion test. As stated above, the Supreme 
Court began its Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Everson v. Board of 
Education  in which the coercion analysis was developed.221 As stated by Justice 
Kennedy, “the Establishment Clause contains two limiting principles: government 
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it 
may not . . . give direct benefits to a religion in such a degree that it in fact 
establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”222 The coercion 
analysis is linked to the framers’ original resolve against any type of state church 
which would rule with an iron fist over its citizens. The coercion analysis is also 
easier to apply to the wide variety of Establishment cases than the cumbersome 
Lemon test and the ambiguous endorsement test. A “coercion” by the state takes 
place where there is a real threat of harm if there is not an act of compliance by the 
citizen.223 For these reasons, the coercion test should be used to analyze whether the 
Ohio state motto constitutes a violation of the Establishment Clause. 
F.  The Ohio State Motto Under the Coercion Analysis 
The Ohio motto does not “coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion 
or its exercise,” but merely makes a statement about God in a generalized, respectful 
and historically constitutional way.224 It is as constitutional as the national motto, 
which not only mentions “God” but makes a statement about how we, as Americans, 
are to relate to Him. Use of the Ohio state motto does not amount to a coercion 
because it demands no act of compliance from which a citizen might experience a 
real threat of harm.225 Ohio’s state motto does not punish citizens of Ohio “for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or 
non-attendance.”226 Ohio’s motto does not establish a state religion or even uphold 
the Christian religion above others. As has been shown the words of the Ohio state 
motto comply with the world’s major religions and fall under the category of a 
constitutionally accepted, generalized, reference to God.  For all of these reasons, 
Ohio’s state motto is found to be constitutional under the coercion analysis.  It has 
been shown that the Ohio state motto stands up under the skewed scrutiny of the 
Lemon and endorsement tests even though the flaws in these tests call for their 
abandonment.  In light of this, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should turn 
to the coercion analysis, the original test used by the Supreme Court, the test 
supported by the history and jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause, and reverse 
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their decision to find the Ohio state motto constitutional under the Establishment 
Clause. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although over two hundred years old, the Establishment Clause continues to be a 
hot bed of debate today. The discussion above has only given a brief glimpse into 
some of the arguments that rage over its history, interpretation, and application. But 
no matter what agreement can be found in relation to the Establishment Clause, a 
constitutional standard will never be derived that eliminates religious strife from 
political life.  However, this is not necessarily a “bad” thing. As Madison saw it, 
“division and opposition among multiple religious sects would make overbearing 
majorities unlikely.”227 And protection from an “overbearing [religious] majority” is 
something about which all interpreters of the Establishment Clause agree. All 
reference to religion and God need not be banned in fear of a state-church.  That was 
not the intention of the framers and that is not the practice today. As the Supreme 
Court stated in Lynch,228 “our history is replete with official references to the value 
and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncements of the 
Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders.”229 The Ohio State motto, “With God 
All Things are Possible” is one such historically accepted, embraced, and 
constitutional acknowledgment of the Divine.   
VI.  EPILOGUE 
Since this paper was written, the Sixth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in a nine to 
four decision, affirmed the judgment of the District Court and concluded that the 
Ohio state motto does not violate the Establishment Clause.230  
The court reached this decision by acknowledging that, historically speaking, 
“the prohibition against enactment of laws establishing religion or paving the way 
for an establishment of religion was not understood to be a prohibition against 
fostering or protecting religion, nor was it understood to be a prohibition against 
employing generalized religious language in official discourse.”231 Citing many 
historical figures, events and cases, the Court acknowledged that the Ohio motto 
does not constitute an establishment of religion as the original framers understood 
the First Amendment.232 
The Court further acknowledged that “coercion” was a central element to the 
original understanding of an establishment of religion.233 In light of this fact, the 
Court began with a coercion analysis and found that the Ohio “motto involves no 
coercion.”234 Rather, they found the motto to be “merely a broadly worded 
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expression of a religious/philosophical sentiment that happens to be widely shared by 
the citizens of Ohio.”235 
The Court went on to analyze the Ohio motto through the eye of the “reasonable 
observer” of the endorsement test.236 The Court found “that no well-informed 
observer could reasonably take Ohio’s motto to be an official endorsement of the 
Christian religion.”237 This conclusion arose from the Court’s acknowledgment that a 
well-informed observer would be aware, from sentiments similar to Ohio’s motto 
found in other historical, religious and secular contexts, that there is “nothing 
uniquely Christian about the thought that all things are possible with God.”238 
Finally, the Court turned its attention to Lemon and concluded that “Ohio’s motto 
easily passes the Lemon test.”239 The Court found that because “the company in 
which Ohio Rev. Code § 5.06 finds itself tends to undermine the thesis that § 5.06 
somehow represents a first step in the direction of ‘an establishment of religion’” and 
because “the government’s assertion of a legitimate secular purpose is entitled to 
deference,”240 the statute adopting the Ohio motto has a secular purpose and meets 
the first prong of the Lemon test.241 The Court felt that Ohio’s motto met the second 
prong of the Lemon test and held that the motto does not have the primary purpose or 
the primary effect of advancing religion.242 The Court stated that they “do not believe 
that a state advances religion impermissibly by adopting a motto that provides no 
financial relief to any church but pays lip service to the puissance of God.”243 The 
Court also felt that because “[t]he primary effect of the national motto is not to 
advance religion, …it clearly follows that the primary effect of the state motto is not 
to advance religion either.”244  Finally, the Court found that the Ohio motto passed 
the third prong of the Lemon test by acknowledging that no institutional 
entanglement with the government is evident.245  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal’s emphasis of coercion as a “central element” 
to the original understanding of the Establishment Clause, coupled with their use of 
the coercion analysis as the first test in determining whether Ohio’s motto violates 
the Establishment Clause, are evidence of the movement toward revitalization of the 
original coercion analysis in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. While the coercion 
analysis alone could have justified the Court’s findings, because of past reliance on 
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the flawed endorsement and Lemon tests, this Court was wise to justify the Ohio 
motto under these tests as well. The Court, basing their decision on logic, history, 
and jurisprudence, rightly held that Ohio’s state motto does not violate the 
Establishment Clause but rather constitutes a historically accepted and constitutional 
acknowledgment of the Divine.  
CHRISTOPHER PIERRE 
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